conversion

KERRY: Well, as I mentioned, I was surprised to see the number of people there. The meeting ranged from several discussions covering several items or things that were happening in the world at the time, so there was quite a considerable discussion about security within the country; one of those three key persons there has now assumed the role of this is doing it now He’s there now He’s in that position right now.

The big thing at the time was Iraq. That was on their agenda, but surprisingly, there was much conversation and talk about Iran. What surprised me and raised my eyebrows was mention, open mention — this was people talking comfortably to one another, not arguing or shouting — but talking comfortably about the Israeli reluctance to strike and provoke Iran into armed action. That was something that raised the hairs on the back of my neck.

It appeared that the Israeli government was entangled in the events here, with an externally dictated role to play, extending beyond Israeli borders. A year later, Israel launched an attack on Hezbollah bases in Lebanon, which Iran backed.

And then the second thing that came out that I recall quite clearly was the mention of Japanese reluctance to create havoc within the Chinese financial sectors.

I couldn’t understand why they discussed that and why it was necessary. What I picked up from this was the Japanese government or those in Japan being coerced or ordered into doing something that would wreck or slow down the Chinese rise to financial power.

They observed that China’s swift economic growth primarily benefited its military, which was undergoing modernization through the funds generated from the global market.

And then, John, things took a turn, and I must admit my subjectivity here. I remember feeling quite unwell and anxious about the discussions that were taking place at that time.

I was on the periphery of this meeting, and I could feel the anxiety rise inside me because this was stuff that was getting spoken about off the cuff. It wasn’t getting announced to anybody. These were things that they already knew about.

So, there was an open discussion about the utilization of biological weapons, specifying their intended locations and times of use and emphasizing the importance of timing. The timing was of paramount significance.

And then, there is more talk centered on how Iran should engage militarily to provoke the desired military response from China.

There is an apparent hope that Iran will fall into armed conflict with Western countries and that China will help Iran. Through this push, either China or Iran will use tactical nuclear weapons.

As I pointed out earlier, these individuals were not making decisions but were deliberating something already planned, exchanging information. As these discussions progressed, it became evident that the primary focus of this meeting was determining when the crucial moment would arrive — when all of this would occur.

Other talks centered on dealing with finances, resources, protection of assets, control of these resources, and bringing in outlying assets. And I can go through this chain of events with you now, Bill, if you like.

JOHN: I’d be pleased to go into as much detail as you feel you can.

KERRY: Okay. Now, as I previously mentioned, they needed either the Chinese or the Iranians to be guilty of the first use of nuclear weapons to justify the next stage.

From this meeting and other sources, it is clear that Iran currently possesses a tactical nuclear capability rather than it being an ongoing development.

JOHN: Do you have some expertise in this subject from your military background?

KERRY: Yes, I do.

JOHN: Okay, this means that in this meeting where you were hearing this information, you could hear this wearing your military hat, with your military experience, and understand strategically and tactically what they were talking about and why.

KERRY: Oh. I could have even stepped in and corrected their terminology because I believed they were getting it wrong, but they were describing it the best way they could.

JOHN: Right.

KERRY: Yes, I have quite a deep knowledge of those weapons and weapons systems.

JOHN: Weapons systems in general; sure. Okay, back to where we were, that was a little footnote you put in there, saying that you felt, anecdotally, but you’re also confident in that opinion, that Iran did have a current nuclear capability.

KERRY: Yes, if I can put this in here, Bill, before this escapes me… it’s anecdotal because the discussion didn’t mention that Iran didn’t have them. The discussion leaned toward the Iranians having that type of weapon and not having them. The absence of mention of the non-existence of weapons leaned towards their possession of such weapons.

JOHN: I understand. Now, I don’t want to get you off track, but there’s the potential analogy with the Iraqi situation, where Western governments and military, whether they knew the truth or not, were undoubtedly telling the public that the Iraqi military capability was far more significant than it was, Is it possible that there was some delusion here concerning Iran’s capability Or do you think they did know what the Iranians have and could do?

KERRY: Making a comparison with Iraq is a natural thing to do. However, in this context, it could be misleading.

The backing that Iraq got during the Iran-Iraq War was Western, And of course, “Western” we must include Israel, so the likelihood of Iraq getting a nuclear weapon that they haven’t produced themselves but getting it imported to them would be extremely low.

On the one hand, we have Iran, which is receiving consistent support from China, Russia, and other countries. The military market is quite open, and even France independently exports their weapons wherever possible.

JOHN: Yes.